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Abstract 
Social media may liberate citizens in societies with stringent media controls and accelerate 
political democratization. Yet, little is known about the relation between social media use and 
perceived constraints in a semi-authoritarian system. This study draws on Media System 
Dependency theory to examine this relation in the context of the 2011 Singapore General 
Election. Our findings, based on national survey data, suggest that perceived control of 
traditional media and political activity is positively related to content production on social 
media as well as the visits to opposition party websites and Facebook pages. Additionally, 
perceived control of mass media is associated with increased consumption of political content 
on social media. Perceived control of the Internet reduces rather than increases content 
production on social media. We argue that social media alters the balance of dependency 
relationships between the government, media organizations and citizens. They create new, meso 
level networked avenues for information gathering and participation during the elections. 
 
Keywords: Democracy, Social Media, Elections, Government Control 
1  Introduction 
The power of new media to influence political processes in democratizing states cannot be 
underestimated. During the impeachment trial of Philippine President Joseph Estrada in 2001, 
about seven million text messages were sent to mobilize a million Filipinos to hit the streets of 
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Manila and protest. This became the first time that new, peer-to-peer media helped force out a 
national leader. In China, public opinion in the blogosphere convinced Beijing that going ahead 
with a city-wide dog cull would create great social tension, as many bloggers likened the policy 
to abortion. Lei (2011) observed that the "Internet has contributed to a more critical and 
politicized citizenry" with citizens no longer being merely compliant receivers of official 
discourse in China.  
In recent years, the open and participatory nature of social media has fuelled new aspirations for 
democracy. Though not without controversies (Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2011), social media‟s 
potential as an agent of social change has been established both during crises and during regular 
elections. Facebook and Twitter, as democratic forces, played a critical role in political 
upheavals in Egypt and Iran (e.g., Grossman 2009; Shane 2011). During the recent Arab Spring, 
social media was a weapon easily available to the citizenry, while more traditional media was 
not (Van Nierkerk, Pillay, & Maharaj, 2011). Social media are also deployed as campaign tools 
in liberal democracies. In the 2008 Presidential elections in the United States, Barack Obama‟s 
campaign was praised for its new media effectiveness (Lenhart, 2008; Stirland, 2008). During 
the 2010 Congressional elections, political campaigns utilized Twitter for political mobilization, 
with many tweets encouraging citizens to vote (Pew Research Center, 2011). In South Korea, 
citizens used Twitter during the 2010 elections for political information, entertainment, and/or 
social utility (Kim, 2011). 
However, little is known about social media use during elections in countries with weak 
democratic traditions. This issue is critical. Social media offer a space for “otherwise 
marginalized voices” (Newsom, Lengel, & Cassara, 2011) banned in the traditional media. They 
become a “balancing force” (Lin, Bagrow, & Lazer, 2011), and activists or the underprivileged 
often turn to social media for political expression. The pattern and motives for social media use 
change in societies where traditional means of free speech are constrained. This is especially 
evident during elections. Citizens‟ perceptions of political control over traditional media, the 
Internet, and political participation may affect how they use social media. Furthermore, in many 
democratizing societies the younger and newly-enfranchised cohorts of digital natives are 
seizing centre-stage in public life. Their means to leverage social media for political expression, 
participation, or mobilization affect the prospect for democracy where it is most needed. 
Accordingly, we conducted a nationally representative survey to probe how perceived political 
control over the Internet, traditional media and political participation motivates Singaporeans to 
consume and produce social media content or visit opposition party websites, and whether this 
motivational effect varies across age cohorts.  
Unlike studies of social media use during crises, our inquiry examines gradual shifts in political 
and media landscapes in a country that is yet to become a full democracy. Singapore, with its 
rather unique mix of efficient and non-corrupt governance (Transparency International, 2011), 
tight political controls (Freedom House, 2011), highly developed communication infrastructure, 
and educated populace, represents an excellent site for studying the role of social media in 
political changes. Moreover, we argue that, within the media system dependency framework 
(MSD), social media alters dependency relationships between the government, media 
organizations and citizens. They create new, meso level networked avenues for information 
gathering and participation during the elections. 
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2  Media System Dependency Theory 
This study draws on MSD to frame how people use social media in a society where free 
expression via other channels, including traditional media, are checked by the government. 
MSD first emerged to explain why media have varying cognitive, affective and behavioural 
effects on different people (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976). It evolved into a complex theory 
that deals with micro links between media and individuals, and macro links between media and 
social institutions. MSD explains how social-political structures (macro), media organizations 
(meso) and individuals (micro) depend on resources from each other to achieve goals 
(Matsaganis & Payne, 2005). It captures dynamic interactions between institutionalized 
constraints in democratizing states, media under varying level of control and individual citizens.  
At the micro level, MSD assumes that individuals are goal-oriented and active in the selection 
and use of media. They depend on media for social or solitary play, self- or social 
understanding, and orientations for action or interactions. Different media meets different goals 
for different people (Lacy, 2000). This is the case with citizens during general elections. 
Elections elevate citizens‟ political interest, their desire to know, talk about, and participate in 
what is happening politically, especially when political information is controlled and 
incomplete.  
At the macro level, audiences are linked in a dependency relationship with social and media 
institutions and this relationship varies according to the stability of social institutions and the 
centrality of media information (Lowrey, 2004). It accentuates social structural determinants of 
media influence (Grant & Guthrie, 1991). Audiences have to rely on information from media to 
achieve their goals (Loges & Ball-Rokeach, 1993). Media draw audiences to survive and 
prosper (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach 1989), while social-political structures crave media and 
popular support to legitimize their hold on power. Achieving these goals takes resources, whose 
inequality creates dependency. A dependency relationship in MSD is “a relationship in which 
the satisfaction of needs or the attainment of goals by one party is contingent on the resources of 
another party” (Ball-Rokeach, 1985). The extent to which media need resources from social-
political structures versus the resources these structures require from media determines media 
dependency. Meanwhile, an individual‟s need for information from media, relative to media‟s 
desire for individual‟s time, attention or purse, creates a micro level dependency (Ball-Rokeach 
1998). The intensity of dependency stems from the perceived helpfulness and exclusivity of 
resources of one party to meet the goals of another (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1982, 1989).  
Viewed via the MSD framework, social media are a new resource which introduce new sources 
of dependency (Riffe, Lacy, & Varouhakis, 2008). Ball-Rokeach (1998) wrote that, “The 
Internet thus intrudes on traditional relations by being integrated into an expanded media system 
that expands the reach of understanding, orientation, and play goals individuals, groups, and 
organizations attain through media dependency relations.” In semi-authoritarian societies, social 
media challenge the monopoly of government-controlled media as venues for information and 
expression. Access to the Internet decreases individuals‟ dependency on government-controlled 
media in China (Sun, Chang, & Yu, 2001). Halpern (1994) explored the role of alternatives to 
the government controlled press in Chile and found that access to new media relates to an 
individual‟s personal access to political information.  
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However, efforts to relate social media, traditional media, and political controls in a non-
democratic society with a MSD framework are rare. Furthermore, issues in existing studies 
undermine MSD‟s explanatory power.  
First, most studies examine media-individual dependency, reducing MSD to a functionalist 
media effect theory. Structural factors are lost in studies of individual behaviour or effects. As a 
remedy, we propose to use individual perceptions of structural constraints to reconnect the 
micro with the meso and macro levels. This reconnection enhances MSD‟s power in the 
prediction of individual behaviours. Second, users have flocked to participate in and express 
themselves through social media. Against this backdrop, MSD needs to recognize participation 
and content production as resources. Accordingly, we investigate the searching for and 
production of social media content as dependency indicators, particularly as traditional media 
increasingly depend on input from social media. Lastly, resource inequality and exclusivity 
between different parties are more intense in authoritarian regimes, as power is more 
concentrated and constraints on organizations and individuals more pronounced. Yet most MSD 
studies have been conducted in Western democracies. We explore the effect of perceived 
government control over mass media, political participation, and the Internet in Singapore, a 
country with high information technology use, but less experience with political democracy.  
3  The 2011 Singapore General Election 
Freedom House (2011) classifies Singapore as a “partly free” society, in which the 
parliamentary elections are held periodically, free of irregularities and fraud, but in which the 
ruling People‟s Action Party (PAP) still dominates the political process. As a critical aspect of 
political control, the traditional media in Singapore operate in a highly structured environment  
controlled by the state in terms of ownership, regulation, degree of liberalization, and ideology. 
The Newspapers and Printing Press Act and the Undesirable Publications Ordinance allow the 
government to refuse the annual renewal of licenses to practice journalism and to censor or ban 
publications that are “likely to cause ill will or misunderstanding between the government and 
the people of Singapore” (Borkhurst-Heng 2002, p. 566). Moreover, the government has largely 
redefined the goals of news media so that they act in support of the nation-building cause, rather 
than to play a “watchdog” role.  
While the government has retained tight control over traditional media, it has applied a “soft 
touch” approach to regulating the Internet, which has lead to the proliferation of Singaporean 
political websites, blogs, news aggregators and social media pages. While national newspapers 
are subject to political controls, online media are allowed to adopt an adversarial position 
towards the ruling party and the government (George & Raman, 2008). The popularity of blogs, 
forums, Facebook and Tweeter has led to an increase in the visibility of political opinions, 
fostering both online and offline participation, which was further boosted by easing of 
restrictions on political gatherings and protests in 2008 (Skoric, Poor, Liao & Teng, 2011). 
The 2011 General Election was by most accounts the most competitive parliamentary election 
in the history of Singapore. In this increasingly competitive political environment, social media 
platforms quickly became prime political battlegrounds. While Singaporeans were criticized in 
the past for being politically apathetic, the 2011 election saw the “political awakening of 
average Singaporeans” (Hoe, 2011; Tsang, 2011), manifested in cyberspace as widespread 
expression of dissatisfaction over government policies. This rise in online activism is also partly 
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due to the amendments and the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Act introduced in 
2010. As a consequence of these changes, political parties and candidates were able to use a 
broader range of online platforms in their electoral campaigns (Hoe, 2011). On the nomination 
day (April 27, 2011), seven political parties (including the ruling PAP) registered their 
candidates with the Elections Department. 
3.1  Hypotheses  
Based on the literature, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1a. Perception of government control over political participation is positively related to 
production and consumption of social media content during the elections. 
H1b. Perception of government control over traditional media is positively related to production 
and consumption of social media content during the elections. 
H1c. Perception of government control over the Internet is negatively related to production and 
consumption of social media content during the elections. 
H2a. Perception of government control over political participation is positively related to 
visiting the websites and Facebook pages of opposition parties. 
H2b. Perception of government control over traditional media is related to a greater likelihood 
of visiting the websites and Facebook pages of opposition parties. 
 
H2c. Perception of government control over the Internet is related to a decreased likelihood of 
visiting the websites and Facebook pages of opposition parties. 
In addition, we are also interested in the importance of political interest, efficacy, age, and other 
demographic variables, and the interactions between the perceptions of government control and 
age, in regard to these questions. 
4  Method 
4.1  Participants 
A post-election computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) survey was conducted by a 
commercial market research firm, with 2,000 respondents. Respondents were able to choose 
from English, Mandarin, or Malay, the three most commonly used languages in Singapore. 
Most calls were made on weekday evenings and on weekends. The fieldwork was conducted 
from 24 May to 17 July 2011. Only eligible voters (Singaporean citizens at least 21 years old) 
were selected to participate. On average, interviews lasted about 35 minutes. The response rate 
was 19%, which is in line with similar studies conducted in the United States (Ansolabehere and 
Schaffner 2011). The average age of respondents in the sample was 44.6 years of age. 47.3% of 
respondents were males, 77.50% were ethnic Chinese, and 59.30% had junior college education 
or greater. As such, the sample is demographically representative of the population in Singapore 
when compared to the latest census data. 
4.2  Measurement 
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The survey contained a range of questions assessing the citizens‟ use of social media and their 
perception of government control of mass media, the Internet, and of political participation. All 
multi-item scales were averaged into indices for analyses. 46.7% of survey respondents reported 
having a Facebook profile, and 3.9% reported using Twitter. 
Social media consumption assessed the time respondents spend on reading contents from social 
media with four items. The survey asked respondents, “How many minutes do you usually 
spend daily to learn about the election on Facebook,” “How many minutes do you usually spend 
daily to read Internet-only Singaporean blogs or news websites about the election” (M = 7.52, 
SD = 17.55, a = .74).  
Social media production measured the frequency that respondents produced content on social 
media. Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with four statements on a five-point 
scale (1 = Never, 5 = Ten times or more), including “I wrote on my blog, my Facebook page or 
Twitter account about the election or matters related to the election” or “I wrote or commented 
on other people‟s blog, Facebook pages, or responded to a tweet on the election or matters 
related to it” (M = 1.18, SD = .52, α = .80).  
Visits to opposition party websites or Facebook pages measured the number of times 
respondents visited websites or Facebook pages of opposition parties. Respondents answered 
seven questions, including “During the election, how many times did you visit websites or 
Facebook pages of the Singapore Democratic Party?” or “During the election, how many times 
did you visit websites or Facebook pages of the Socialist Front?” (M = 1.14, SD = .43, a = .89).  
Political interest was measured by asking respondents to indicate agreement on a five-point 
Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree) to the statement, “I am interested in 
political issues” (M = 3.16, SD = 1.04).  
Efficacy for free discussion (discussion efficacy) was measured by asking respondents if they 
agreed (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree) with the statement, “When I discuss politics 
with others, I am able to raise questions freely” (M = 3.59, SD = .87).  
Perceived government control of traditional media (traditional media control) was measured by 
asking respondents if they agreed (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree) with the statement 
that “There is too much government control of newspapers and television” (M = 3.42, SD = 
.98).  
Perceived government control over political participation (participation control) was measured 
by asking respondents if they agreed (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree) with the 
statement, “There are too many rules against participating in political activities in Singapore” 
(M = 3.40, SD = .88).  
Perceived government control of the Internet (Internet control) was measured by asking 
respondents if they agree (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree) to the statement, “There 
are too many restrictions on what people can write about politics and government online, 
including on the blogs, Faceook and Twitter” (M = 3.19, SD = .91).  
Demographic factors, including age, gender, education and race, were measured and analyzed as 
control variables. In order to examine the mediating role of age and avoid multicollinearity, both 
age and perceived government control (on Internet, traditional media or political participation) 
were centred before being built into the interaction items.  
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5  Findings 
For our analysis, three OLS linear hierarchical regression models were used to predict social 
media production, social media consumption and visits to opposition party websites or 
Facebook pages. The first block was composed of demographic variables, the second block 
includes efficacy and political interest, the third block includes traditional media control, 
Internet control and participation control, and the final block consists of interaction items 
between age (centered) and the three perceived control variables (Table 1).  
H1a is partially supported. Greater perceived government control over political participation in 
Singapore is positively related to the production of social media content during the elections (β 
=. 06, p < .01). However, perceived control over political participation does not affect the 
consumption of social media content (β =. 03, p = .23).  
H1b is supported, as perceived government control over traditional media is positively related to 
greater production (β =. 16, p < .01) and more consumption (β =. 10, p < .01) of social media 
content during the elections. 
H1c is partially supported. Perception of government control of the Internet is negatively related 
to the production of social media content during the elections (β = -.06, p <.01). Nevertheless, 
perceived control of the Internet is not related to the consumption of social media content (β = -
.04, p = .33). 
Table 1 Predictors of social media use during the elections 




Visits to opposition 
party webpages 
 β(SE) β(SE) β(SE) 
Gender -.03 (.02) -.04 (.75) -.05 (.02)* 
Age -.17(.00)** -.15 (.03)** -.11 (.00)** 
Race .02 (.03) -.03 (.90) -.01 (.02) 
Education .09(.01)** .11 (.22)** .06 (.01)* 
∆R2 .09 .09 .05 
Discussion efficacy .11(.01)** .10 (.44)** .03 (.01) 
Political interest .14 (.01)** .17 (.38)** .15 (.01)** 
∆R2 .05 .05 .02 
Participation control .06 (.01)** .03(.48) .06 (.01)* 
Traditional media 
control 
.16(.01)** .09 (.44)** .12 (.01)** 
Internet control -.06 (.01)* -.04 (.45) -.01 (.01) 
∆R2 .03 .01 .02 
Age x Participation 
control 
-.07(.00)** -.05 (.03) -.05 (.00)* 
Age x Traditional 
media control 
-.14(.00)** -.08 (.03)** -.04 (.00) 
Age x Internet control .05(.00)* .02 (.03) .00 (.00) 
∆R2 .03 .01 .01 
R2 .20 .16 .10 
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Note. *p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
H2a is supported, as perception of government control over political participation is positively 
associated with the likelihood of visiting the opposition parties‟ websites and Facebook pages (β 
=. 06, p < .05). 
H2b is supported. The stricter people perceive government control over traditional media to be, 
the more they tend to visit opposition parties‟ websites and Facebook pages (β = .12, p < .01) . 
H2c is not supported. Perceived government control of the Internet is not related to the 
likelihood of visiting opposition parties‟ websites and Facebook pages (β = -.01, p = .44). 
The interaction between age and participation control (β = -.07, p < .01) and between age and 
traditional media control (β = -.14, p < .01) predict the production of social media content 
(Table 1). The older people are, the less perceived government control over political 
participation and over traditional media affects their content production on social media. 
However, this trend is reversed when the interaction between age and perceived government 
control of the Internet is concerned (β = .05, p < .05). Although greater perceived control of the 
Internet discourages production of social media content, this trend is attenuated among the older 
section of the population.  
The interaction between age and perceived control over traditional media (β = -.08, p < .01) 
predicts the consumption of social media content. This relation is weakened among older 
people. However, neither the interaction between age and participation control (β = -.05, p = 
.13) nor that between age and perceived Internet control (β = .02, p = .10) predicts the 
consumption of social media content.  
Among the three interaction items, the interaction between age and perceived control over 
political participation is related to the number of visits to opposition party websites or Facebook 
pages (β = -.05, p < .05), meaning, the positive relation between perceived control over political 
participation and visits of opposition party websites is weaker among older citizens. However, 
the interaction between age and perceived control over traditional media (β =-.04, p =.15) and 
that between age and government control of the Internet (β = .00, p = .74) were not related to 
the number of visits to opposition party websites or Facebook pages. 
6  Discussion and Conclusion 
This study finds that political interest and efficacy are related to increased production and 
consumption of social media content even outside Western liberal democracies. We also find 
that social media can be a “balancing force” to the traditional media (Lin, Bagrow, & Lazer, 
2011), as perceived government control of the traditional media is associated with more 
production and consumption of social media content, as well as increased visits to opposition 
party websites and Facebook pages. This relationship is stronger for younger citizens. They are 
more likely to contribute to and consume content when they perceive increased government 
control over traditional media. We also find that  Singaporeans tend to produce more social 
media content and increase visits to opposition party websites and Facebook pages as they see 
increased control over political participation. This effect  is stronger with younger citizens, yet, 
people are less likely to create social media content when they see the Internet as a controlled 
space. 
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The impact of political interest and efficacy on social media use in Singapore echoes findings 
from Western societies (e.g., Anderson 2003; Kenski & Stroud, 2006). It also suggests that in a 
society where restrictions on political speech in social media are less stringent than on other 
platforms, citizens are likely to turn to Facebook, Twitter or blogs to compensate for the 
perceived inadequacies of the traditional media coverage during major political events, such as 
general elections. This prospect is encouraging for political pluralism. Despite the dominance of 
the ruling PAP,  Singaporeans are increasingly exposed to a diversity of voices from the 
opposition parties via social media (Leea & Kan, 2009). By implication, if the “soft touch” 
policy of Internet control remains, social media can provide an ideal environment for political 
expression and dissenting opinions. However, our findings also suggest that this trend could be 
reversed if the government tightens its grip on the Internet; indeed, our findings show a weak 
but significant negative link between perceptions of government control over the Internet and 
content production on social media. 
From the MSD perspective, the dynamics of media dependencies are altered by the introduction 
of social media into the socio-political landscape (Riffe, Lacy, & Varouhakis, 2008). When 
opportunities for political participation and self-expression are deemed resources, the perception 
that political participation is restricted by the government indicates that participatory resources 
from daily interactions are scarce. Citizens‟ needs to participate in political processes are not 
satisfied by the existing means and modalities. However, the relatively free domain of social 
media creates new opportunities for citizens to become involved in politics. With MSD,  
resource exclusivity increases the intensity of dependency (Ball-Rokeach, 1998).  Accordingly, 
if people perceive control over political participation as more stringent, then opportunities to 
produce social media content and access opposition party information become more exclusive. 
Consequently, citizens increase their use of social media, which in turn increases dependency on 
this new network. Similarly, perceived control of traditional media reduces the information and 
participatory resources people think they can obtain. Given the interactivity of social media and 
their relative freedom in Singapore, exclusivity of these resources through social media is high 
and citizens are motivated to use social media for political content production, consumption or 
for information about opposition parties. Likewise, perceived control over the Internet could 
tarnish the lure of social media, and reduce people‟s dependency on social media for political 
expression.  
These findings indicate a change in the dynamics of dependencies in Singapore, sparked by the 
boom of a social media system. In a society where the authorities maintain exact control over 
political participation and traditional media, yet offer leeway to social media, exclusivity of 
participatory opportunities on social media is bound to grow. Consequently, citizens reduce 
their dependency on the traditional media and increase dependency on social media. We argue 
that this triggers a chain of consequences for the dependency system in Singapore. As social 
media need to distinguish themselves from the muffled voices of traditional media, they require 
participation from citizens. As citizens depend more on social media, social media may in turn 
depend more on citizens as participants. Social media‟s direct, close links with individuals and 
grassroots movements offer a unique market advantage. 
In contrast, the traditional media are concerned with both the authorities and the market. Facing 
competition from social media, the traditional media have to depend more on citizens to remain 
relevant and profitable. The appearance of social media attenuates traditional media‟s 
dependency on political authorities, and diversifies their sources of information. For example, a 
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photograph showing a housemaid carrying backpack for a Singaporean serviceman sparked 
heated debates in most traditional media after first appearing in social media (Lim, 2011). 
Moreover, the political authorities are increasingly embracing social media, as many ministers 
and MPs have their own Facebook and Twitter accounts, trying to reach out to ordinary 
Singaporeans. The emergence of this new form of alternative, networked media reduces the 
resource exclusivity of, and government dependency on, traditional media. These movements 
imply that social media can act as a liberating technology, altering the dependencies between 
the political structure, mass media and individual citizens. Furthermore, our study shows that a 
two-tier system of political control over mass and social media seems to be driving citizens 
towards more pro-opposition content online. 
We suggest that the age differences uncovered have implications for the process of political 
change in Singapore and elsewhere. Compared to older citizens, younger citizens‟ stronger 
reaction to perceived political control may be explained by better knowledge, stronger interest 
and a higher sense of self-efficacy when using new technologies. There is also an indication of 
heightened political interest and increased activism among the younger, more civically-minded 
generation of Singaporeans (Lee, 2002). Easy access to social media infrastructure, elevated 
expectations, and better understanding of new technologies make younger people more active 
social media users. In contrast, the older strata of the population are less motivated by 
perceptions of political control to seek alternative channels of political information and 
engagement. While greater youth participation is definitely desirable, we also see this pattern as 
an indicator of a possible digital divide, where citizens lacking appropriate social media skills 
are likely to be excluded from certain civic and political activities. 
This study is limited in several regards. First, it is conducted in Singapore, a unique city-state. 
Its British colonial history, ethnic diversity and wealth, combined with strict political controls 
definitely present an idiosyncratic setting for studying social media and politics. Future inquiries 
should cross-validate the theoretical statements we established in different cultures and contexts. 
Second, given the low cost, personalized content and circumstances of social media use, we can 
expect that it may enhance the meso and micro levels of MSD in forms of more participation at 
the individual level. The resources of social media can alter the nature of dependency 
relationships which are based on the assumption of scarce media resources. A more ambitious 
re-conceptualization of MSD may be needed for further endeavours. To conclude, our study 
offers a reformulation of MSD by adding social media as an alternative to traditional media at 
the meso level, testing the dynamics of dependency relations in a partly-free society, 
operationalizing socio-political structural factors as individual perceptions of political control to 
predict individual social media use for political information consumption and expression, and 
including political participation and content production as resources from the media system in 
the MSD framework. Our study suggests a critical change in the dependency system following 
the debut of social media and predicts further chain effects in the system. It demonstrates that 
during significant political events such as presidential elections, citizens tend to flock to less 
regulated media platforms in an attempt to compensate for restrictions in other domains. Future 
studies should test these changes in different contexts, preferably employing more sophisticated 
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